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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
 
 
This article describes the main charac-
teristics of international cooperation in the 
Baltic Sea Region (BSR) within the frame-
work of the EU macroregional strategy. 
The analysis of the key directions, structu-
re, and the Strategy implementation mecha-
nisms demonstrates its experimental and 
innovative nature. At the same time, the 
authors identify problems and contradic-
tions in the very idea of the Strategy, as 
well as its actual implementation in inter-
governmental relations of the BSR coun-
tries. The main factor hampering the Strategy 
activities is ignoring the key role of Russia 
the BSR. At the same time, Russia and some 
non-BSR countries are already members of 
all significant BSR cooperation instruments. 
Therefore, there is a need to supplement 
the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
with the Northern Dimension project. The 
innovative nature of macroregional coope-
ration in the Baltic Sea region is mani-
fested in interpreting the region as an indi-
visible whole rather than an administrative 
unite serving as a platform for various co-
operation programmes implemented in its 
different parts. From this point of view, the 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea region, appar-
ently inspired by ‘rational functionalism’, 
can assign a new meaning to the concept of 
the region. 
 
Key words: the EU Strategy for the Bal-
tic Sea Region, Northern Dimension, regi-
on, macroregional cooperation 
 
Recently, Baltic Sea states have 
been cooperating not only in the tradi-
tional framework of bilateral relations 
and decades-old organisations and pro-
grammes, but also within the first EU 
macroregional strategy developed for 
this region. Being an innovative and, to 
a large degree, experimental project, 
the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Re-
gion (EUSBSR) [11] is of particular 
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importance for Europe. It is innovative, since the Strategy is managed at the 
transnational rather than the regional level (‘a Europe of regions’) and it 
strives to involve non-EU countries in the process (the European Neighbour-
hood Policy). The very fact of EUSBSR’s existence stresses the need for the 
gradual development of a new level of the EU administration between the 
levels of a nation-states and the European community. 
The EUSBSR is experimental due to the special geopolitical status of the 
Baltic Sea region — a post-Cold war success story of European integration. 
After the Berlin Wall fell, most Baltic Sea countries were beyond the borders 
of the European Union. Out of seven coastal states, only Denmark and West 
Germany were members of the EU. Two decades later, the geopolitical situa-
tion changed drastically. Eight of nine coastal states are members of the EU — 
Denmark and Germany were joined by Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Li-
thuania, and Poland. Two other states involved in Baltic cooperation — Nor-
way and Iceland — are partly integrated into the EU (among other things, in 
the European Economic Area and the Schengen Agreement). Thus, the Bal-
tic Sea almost became a territorial sea of the European Union with the only — 
yet important — exception of Russia. The Russian Federation and its ex-
clave city of Kaliningrad, being an integral part of the Baltic Sea region, will 
remain outside the EU borders in the foreseeable future. Russia’s hybrid role 
as a participant in regional cooperation and a country neighbouring the EU is 
turning EUSBSR in somewhat of a border between the internal and external 
policies of the European Union. 
The Europeanisation of the Baltic Sea is a result of regional cooperation, 
which developed independently from the EU. This cooperation led to the 
emergence of such a great number of transnational networks, organisations, 
and institutions that listing all of them would be complicated even for a spe-
cialist. A wide variety of forms of cooperation became a real strength of the 
region, which has a reputation of a transnational cooperation laboratory. 
Moreover, this diversity was often perceived by local actors as a weakness, 
since cooperation lacked a common purpose or mission. In the 1990s, this 
mission was just a declaration. It embodied in supporting eastern Baltic Sea 
countries in their transition from authoritarianism to democracy and from a 
planned to a market economy. When the Baltics and Poland accessed to the 
EU and NATO in 2004, this mission was almost completed. Cooperation in 
the Baltic Sea region reached its high point but lost momentum. It fell victim 
to its success. Looking for a new mission, regional cooperation entered the 
stage of stagnation. 
The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) developed against 
this background. This idea was first formulated in the end of 2005 in the 
European Parliament by the Baltic-Europe intergroup — an informal asso-
ciation of EP members led by the British conservative politician Christopher 
Beazely [6]. At first, this initiative did not produce a positive reaction, al-
though it was supported by a resolution adopted by the EP in November 
2006 [13]. However, during their EU presidency in 2006 and 2007, both 
Finland and Germany were reluctant to further the issue. Only the Swedish 
government raised it for discussion prior to the country’s 2009 presidency. 
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In December 2007, under the pressure from Sweden, the European Council 
agreed as follows: ‘The strategy should: i) be without prejudice to the Inte-
grated Maritime Policy (IMP) endorsed in the same conclusions; ii) inter alia 
help to address the urgent environmental challenges related to the Baltic Sea; 
and iii) the Northern Dimension (ND) framework should provide the basis 
for the external aspects of co-operation in the region’ [20, p. 16]. 
The European Commission delegated the preparation to the Directorate-
General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO). The Directorate 
headed a permanent committee, which also included the Directorates-Gene-
ral for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE), Environment (DG ENV), 
and the External Relations (DG RELEX). In total, the process of EUSBSR 
preparation involved 19 Directorates, which was a serious test for the Euro-
pean Commission. EUSBSR public consultations started officially at the Sta-
keholder Conference in Stockholm on September 30, 2008. Prior to this 
event, the European Commission had published a working paper, which 
identified the key priorities of EUSBSR — environment (‘to enable a sus-
tainable environment’, economics (‘to enhance the region’s prosperity’), in-
frastructure (‘to increase accessibility and attractiveness), and security (to 
ensure safety and security in the region) [16]. 
In the months to follow, round tables focusing on each priority were held. 
The final stage of the consultation process was the second Stakeholder Con-
ference, which took place in Rostock on February 6, 2009. In Rostock, the 
European Commission presented a preliminary list of possible actions for the 
EUSBSR. An action plan was devised in March. Consultations between dif-
ferent Directorates and EC Directorates and Services took place in April and 
May. In June 2009, the Commission adopted the final variant, which was sub-
mitted to the European Council as a communique. The Council, in tis turn, 
made the final decision approving the Strategy in December 2009 [9]. 
When analysing the Strategy preparation, it is important to consider three 
aspects. Firstly, the fact that the Strategy was outlined by the European 
Council largely affected the nature of ensuing discussions. The EUSBSR 
text approved by the Council contains two important elements. The first one 
is the focus on environmental problems, especially navigation-related ones. 
The other is that the Baltic Sea is perceived as a territorial sea of the EU. 
Therefore, external relations have to be tackled within the Northern Dimen-
sion. The Council also calls for an effective division between the internal 
and external policies [7, p. 443]. It is of interest that such interpretation con-
tradicts the established practices of solving the most acute problems of the 
Baltic Sea, including the environmental ones and those associated with 
transnational and transboundary maritime traffic. These problems concern 
non-EU member states by default. Moreover, this position of the European 
Council differs drastically from that formulated in the EP resolution outlin-
ing a Baltic Sea Region Strategy for the Northern Dimension and stressing 
that one of the resolution’s objectives was to ‘support the Northern Dimen-
sion policy by defining the Baltic Sea region as one of the main priority ar-
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eas’ [13]. As one can see, the European Parliament associates the EUSBSR 
with the Northern Dimension in several aspects, whereas the European 
Council and Commission emphasise the difference between the Strategy and 
external cooperation. 
Secondly, it is important to consider the differences in administrative 
structure. The European Commission proposed a strategy designed to coor-
dinate the existing strategies and to monitor and review their progress, needs, 
and problems, striving to retain the initial impetus of the Action Plan. More-
over, the Commission supported minimising the number of institutional 
mechanism and avoiding additional funding of the EUSBSR. The resolution 
called for a different solution — holding an annual Baltic Sea states’ summit 
prior to the summer session of the European Council and expand regional 
organisations within and beyond the EU system. The Parliament stressed that 
the Strategy could be financed as part of the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument, thus considering the Strategy an element of the Un-
ion’s external policy. Therefore, the Parliament saw the EUSBSR as a more 
ambitious action plan than the Commission did. 
Finally, the third important component was the efforts taken to improve 
the Strategy. The public consultation process, which took place from August 
2008 through September 2009, was meant not only to contribute to impro-
ving the Strategy but also to simplify the process of its approval. Consulta-
tions brought together states, regions, non-governmental and international 
governmental organisation, and individual citizens. A total of 109 written 
and oral proposals were made at the two Stakeholder Conferences (in Stock-
holm in August 2008 and in Rostock in February 2009), at the youth confe-
rence and Hamburg, and during the Internet forum held in November-De-
cember 2008. Consultations resulted in formulating basic positions shared by 
most participants: 
— the absolute need for a strategy for the Baltic Sea region; 
— the need for an integrated approach for securing results; 
— importance of the EC’s contribution to the development of the Strategy; 
— a focus on concrete projects for yielding tangible results, 
— the lack of the need for new institutions given a significant number of 
existing organisations, 
— ambition to leave behind hollow statements and work with the leading 
countries to achieve concrete goals within a specified time. 
What was the final result? Firstly, it is important to stress the Strategy’s 
concern with a better coordination of existing regional cooperation forms. 
The Strategy does not propose any new cooperation schemes (however, it 
emphasises that a better distribution of funds and initiatives will stimulate 
activities in the region). A major consideration is that an integrated approach 
is necessary to ensure the sustainable development of the region. These 
problems are interrelated, whereas the existing cooperation plans are not suf-
ficiently coordinated. This creates an opportunity for functional improve-
ment in the framework of the current institutions, policies, and financial re-
sources. 
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The Strategy [11] identifies four pillars that either pose a serious threat 
or are associated with untapped potential: 
1) improving the environmental conditions of the Baltic Sea (the whole 
region); 
2) contributing to a more balanced economic development in the region; 
3) making the region more accessible and attractive; 
4) contributing to safety and security. 
These four pillars are divided into 15 priority areas. The idea is to formu-
late concrete objectives and appoint EU member states responsible for 
achieving them. A total of 76 initiatives were proposed. Each initiative con-
tains concrete projects specifying prospective lead partners, targets, and re-
porting periods. As to the methods, the European Commission issued a list 
of priorities as a living document subject to continuous updates. The logic 
behind it suggests that for a macroregional policy to be effective it should be 
flexible enough to adapt to new circumstances. 
Indeed, as the practice shows, the EUSBSR is a living document, which 
is continually edited and updated to increase its adaptability to changing ex-
ternal and internal conditions. On the one hand, it suggests specifying goals 
and objectives. In the first half of 2012, under the Danish presidency, three 
major goals were formulated for a more effective implementation of the 
Strategy [11]: 
— saving the sea, 
— increasing regional cohesions, 
— securing prosperity. 
On the other hand, the Strategy encourages a constant search for a more 
efficient mechanism to manage cooperation within the EUSBSR, since the 
Strategy’s implementation is associated with a number of urgent political 
and administrative problems. 
It is important to take into account that, when devising the EUSBSR, the 
EC strived to take into account proposals made by different political actors 
during numerous consultations. As a result, the final version of the docu-
ment, which mostly meets public expectations, turned out to be too broad, 
complicated, and often vague. Striving to credit all participants in regional 
cooperation, the Commission often merely renamed existing initiatives and 
projects, which undermines the initial intent to give new impetus for stagnat-
ing cooperation in the Baltic Sea region through providing a clearly formu-
lated, coordinated, and action-oriented strategy. Therefore, it could be logi-
cal to create an abridged version of the EUSBSR containing a short list of the 
most significant projects. However, projects have to be short-listed by not only 
the Commission but also their immediate participants, which, being part of the 
Strategy will have to sacrifice or at least moderate their individual interests. 
In large states, such as Germany and Poland, it relates to managing relations 
between the centre and regions and harmonising transnational and EU inter-
ests in the Baltic region. 
Unlike the political content of the EUSBSR, particularities of project 
management remain unclear. The only thing that was formulated explicitly is 
the intent to implement the Strategy using a continually updated action plan 
without a specified implementation period. 
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The idea of the European Commission to implement the Strategy using a 
continually updated action plan was strongly supported during consultations. 
In particular, the stakeholders unanimously approved of the proposal sug-
gesting that each priority action should be described through identifying 
1) relevant measures; 2) time frames; 3) financial instruments; 4) responsible 
actors. Another popular idea was introducing a fifth element — monitoring 
success through measuring results. Thus, it was suggested to develop a sys-
tem of parameters and standards to monitor the progress [21]. 
It was also proposed to include the most effective solutions in different 
areas into annual Strategy reports. Most stakeholders agreed that the action 
plan had to be regularly monitored, revised, and edited. 
There is certain vagueness about the management mechanisms, which is 
most probably accounted for by basic contradictions. Firstly, there is a need 
for actors of all levels (national, regional, and local) and all sectors (private 
and public) to participate in the Strategy implementation. At the same time, 
some stakeholders call for ‘strong leadership’ and ‘top down’ management, 
which would ensure an effective implementation of the action plan. The 
most probable leader is the European Commission, although it sees itself 
mostly as a mediator. 
The second set of management problems concerns institutionalisation. 
Support for the existing Baltic Sea region cooperation institutions was voi-
ced during consultations. Almost all stakeholders believe that the EUSBSR 
strategy should be implemented by the existing regional organisations. The 
Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) and the Council of the Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS) are expected to play an important role in the future, since they made 
an important contribution to the preparation of the Strategy. Nevertheless, 
the stakeholders called for reforming the institutional network. Sometimes, 
the EUSBSR is considered as an opportunity for regional organisations to 
revise their goals and priorities and ensure a better coordination of their ac-
tions. In other words, ‘everyone must not do everything', as it was put in the 
final document of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference [12]. 
There are different perspectives on the desirability of institutional re-
forms. A number of stakeholders, including the federal and state govern-
ments of Germany oppose the idea of creating new institutional structures 
stressing the risk of duplication of responsibilities. However, a simple major-
ity of stakeholders supports institutional innovations. 
It is worth stressing that the European Commission launched this discus-
sion through proposing public consultations to create a structured and sus-
tainable forum, which would include coordinated decision-making mecha-
nisms. This idea was highly appreciated by the Polish government, which 
believed the establishment of a EUSBSR forum to be instrumental in bring-
ing together national, regional, and local authorities, and social partners. Lo-
cal Government Denmark, an organisation of Danish municipalities, also 
supported the idea of a new discussion forum for decision-makers, which 
would monitor the EUSBSR. The most far-reaching proposal was put for-
ward in the joint document prepared by six organisations (the Baltic Sea 
States Subregional Co-operation, B71, Euroregion Baltic, the Conference of 
                                                     
1 B7 is seven largest islands in the Baltic Sea belonging to five countries. 
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Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe, and the Union of Baltic Cities) [7]. 
These organisations suggested creating a new ‘governance model’ that 
would include two main bodies: a Baltic Sea forum and a decision-making 
body. A forum was to become a platform for consultations open to anyone 
interested in the Baltic cooperation, including non-EU actors. A decision 
making body — bringing together elected representative from national, re-
gional and local levels — had to monitor the progress in Strategy implemen-
tation. Both bodies were to be headed by the European Commission. 
As a result, a compromise was reached — the EUSBSR fora have been 
held annually in various Baltic EU member states since 2010. At the fora, 
politicians, experts, academicians, journalists, NGOs, and other stakeholders 
discuss a wide range of issues pertaining to regional development. The host 
party prepares a final report outlining the results of discussion and contain-
ing remarkable proposals and recommendations. 
The implementation of the EUSBSR necessitated not only adapting goals 
and objectives to each stage but also improving their practical execution. On 
September 10, 2015, a new plan covering 13 priority areas and four horizon-
tal actions was presented to the European Commission. Special attention was 
paid to simplifying the implementation of flagship projects and increasing 
the role of regional organisations. Each cooperation project was to be super-
vised by an EU member state, regional organisations, business associations, 
or NGOs responsible for coordinating relevant actions [4]. 
Another focus was attracting new participants and creating a favourable 
public image of the EUSBSR projects and programmes. This was attained 
through a thought-through public campaign. A good example is A Beginner's 
Guide to the Baltic Sea Region Strategy published by the Swedish Agency 
for Economic and Regional Growth (Tillvaxtverket) [3]. 
Financing has been one of the key issues at all stages of the EUSBSR 
development, approval, and implementation. Relevant discussions are domi-
nated by two central ideas. Firstly, the Strategy has to be financed from all 
possible sources — the EU, member states, international financial institu-
tions, and private funds. Secondly, it is necessary to improve the mecha-
nisms for coordinating different financial instruments, i. e. increase their ef-
ficiency and effectiveness. The EP’s request to allocate a special budget line 
for the Baltic region strategy was supported by the governments of Poland 
and Lithuania [7, р. 448]. However, most stakeholders concur with the 
European Commission insisting that the Strategy should be financed using 
existing channels. Thus, the idea of a new budget line for the Strategy was 
shelved. Instead, it was suggested to concentrate on the proposition made by 
Sweden and the BaltMe corporation to ensure the transparency and account-
ability of financing. A decision was reached to draw up ‘somewhat of a 
budget’ — not a budget in the strict sense but rather a balance sheet listing 
sources of financing and uses of funds. 
Despite the general concurrence regarding the limited funds, this does 
not mean that there are no opportunities to attract additional resources. For 
instance, the Swedish government deemed it necessary to draw particular 
attention to sources of funding that had not been mentioned earlier in the 
context of the EUSBSR. Primarily, it concerned the decision of the Nordic 
Investment Bank (NIB) to establish a department for financing environ-
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mental initiatives in the Baltic Sea region to facilitate the implementation of 
the HELCOM Action Plan. The European Neighbourhood Investment Fund, 
which supports investment in large infrastructure projects to a much greater 
degree than the earlier EU mechanisms did, was mentioned as another possi-
ble source of financing. 
Despite the obvious success of the EUSBSR, it is becoming clear that the 
Strategy is not immune to either intra- or extra-EU or problems and dis-
agreements. The two central problems are managing the Strategy implemen-
tation and developing relations with Russia. 
There is no doubt that the EUSBSR gave additional impetus to coopera-
tion in the Baltic Sea region. However, numerous issues, relating primarily 
to political leadership, financing, and decision-making, remain unresolved. 
The European Commission, which was expected to play the leading role in 
managing the Strategy, is overloaded with crisis phenomena occurring in the 
EU and is incapable to monitor macroregional programmes. This accounts 
for the propensity to delegate responsibility to states interested in regional 
cooperation. Certain steps have already been taken but the Commission is 
still convinced that the Baltics have to be more active in coordinating prior-
ity areas, assuming leadership in horizontal actions and flagman projects, 
etc. [8]. In particular, they are very reluctant to spend moneys received from 
EU structural funds to attain goals formulated in the EUSBSR, to say moth-
ing of national resources for stimulating transboundary cooperation. There 
are doubts over the commitment of the Baltics to the ideas formulated of the 
EUSBSR or, at least, the countries’ readiness to sacrifices national priorities. 
At the same time, it is important to consider the concerns of the Baltics 
about the increasing bureaucratisation of the EUSBSR. Growing require-
ments for document management and complications associated with their 
approval reduce the efficiency of actions. This can be easily explained, since 
commitment to the three no’s principle (no new funding, no new legislation, 
and no new institutions) was declared in the very beginning. In other words, 
the only was is to deal with the existing resource and legal and administra-
tive frameworks, which do not always consistent with the new objectives. It 
is not a coincidence that this issue is the focus of heated discussions initi-
ated, in particular, by the Baltic Development Forum [8]. 
However, the key question is what the ultimate goal of the EUSBSR is — 
the EU assuming control over cooperation in the Baltic or a new impetus to 
the European macroregion, which would use its own resources to develop 
cooperation between all (including non-EU) stakeholders? 
Despite its attractiveness, from the very beginning, the EUSBSR raised 
certain doubts over its external component, since it almost completely ig-
nored Russia as a key factor of the Strategy’s potential success at either the 
development or the implementation stages. Moreover, all the other signifi-
cant Baltic cooperation institutions include Russian and other third countries. 
A Conclusion issued by the European Commission in December 2007 
contains the only phrase mentioning the EU as a factor of the EUSBSR ad-
ministration: ‘The Northern Dimension framework provides the basis for the 
external aspects of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region’ [10]. This phrasing 
stresses the difference between the external and internal dimensions of coop-
eration in the Baltic, which did not take place earlier, at least in the frame-
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work of institutional design. The need to integrate Baltic cooperation into the 
macroregional EU strategy raises the question as to whether (and how) third 
countries can participate in this cooperation. This concerns not only Russia 
but also, to a degree, Norway and Iceland, Ukraine and Belarus — countries 
situated in the Baltic Sea basin and thus involved in certain, primarily envi-
ronmental, aspects of cooperation. 
Most stakeholders welcome the idea of making the Northern Dimension 
(ND) an external foundation of the EUSBSR. At the same time, German and 
Danish governments, stressing the intention to involve Russian into regional 
cooperation, avoid providing direct support for using the ND to this extent. 
Only the Baltic Institute of Finland consider the ND as unsuitable for the 
Russian dimension of the EU policy in the Baltic Sea region, since it is inca-
pable of covering the whole range of cooperation problems in the Baltic Sea 
[10]. In effect, the ND comprises two types of partnership — in environ-
mental protection and healthcare. Today, partnerships in transport and logis-
tics are being forged [1]. Cooperation with Russia and other third countries 
takes place either in the framework of such organisations as the Council of 
Baltic Sea States and HELCOM or beyond institutional frameworks, as it is 
the case with the European maritime policy. In the course of consultations, 
all stakeholders except for the Estonian government identified one or several 
cooperation priorities, where they deem Russian participation desirable or 
necessary [15, р. 87]. All these proposals pertain to 37 different problems 
suggesting Russian participation. These problems fall into all of the four pil-
lars of the Strategy. This gives rise to a question as to how the gap between 
the desired and actual levels of the Baltic cooperation between the EU and 
Russia can be bridged. Although most documents avoid these issues, Euro-
pean analysts discuss the following approaches. 
The first approach can be described as maintaining the status quo, since 
it is aimed at preserving the existing flexible architecture of cooperation in 
the Baltic Sea taking place within the ND and beyond it. An illustration of 
this approach is the position taken by the German government, which sup-
ports the idea of selective geographical limitations [15, р. 119]. Thus, some 
EU programmes can be open for third countries. For example, Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania proposed using such approach within the Europe for 
Citizens programme. This flexible approach has two advantages. Firstly, it 
can be adopted without significant institutional changes. Secondly, such non-
Nordic countries as Ukraine and Belarus can be easily involved in coopera-
tion. However, it is not compatible with the idea of turning the ND into the 
external foundation of the EUSBSR. 
The second approach emphasises the regional dimension of subnational 
levels of cooperation between Russia and third countries. This is the idea 
formulated by six Baltic Sea organisations (the Baltic Sea States Subregional 
Co-operation, B7, Euroregion Baltic, the Conference of Peripheral Maritime 
Regions of Europe, and the Union of Baltic Cities), which suggests launch-
ing a special flagman project entitled ‘Incorporating the external dimension 
of the Baltic Sea’ [17]. The external dimension includes Russia, Ukraine, 
and Belarus and it is implemented by means of paradiplomacy focusing on 
subnational units — regions and cities. A considerable advantage of this ap-
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proach is that it preserves the ND institutional structure almost intact, since 
cooperation with third countries would take place within the ‘logic of infor-
mal institutions’. A similar, although less detailed proposal came from Ham-
burg [21, р. 12]. This proposal lays particular emphasis on expanding and 
strengthening cooperation with Russia’s North-West, including a forum for 
discussing ‘disagreements’, which could evolve into a model cooperation 
with other Russian regions. The Polish Convent of Marshals also supports 
developing new tools for cooperation between the EU and Russia, which 
would involve non-governmental organisations, local and regional authori-
ties, and educational and cultural institutions. 
Finally, the third approach focuses on the institutional development of 
the Northern Dimension. Several proposals contained the idea of supple-
menting the ND with new types of partnership or modifying the existing 
ones so that they can meet the goals and objectives of the Strategy. For in-
stance, the Baltic-Europe intergroup called for institutional modification in 
environmental protection. The European Parliament wants to involve Kalin-
ingrad in the ND healthcare partnership. Other proposals expect the Council 
of the Baltic Sea States and the ND to create a solid foundation for the Strat-
egy’s external aspects [19]. 
Overall, an answer to the question about the most efficient solution to the 
problems relating to the Russian participation in an intra-EU programme has 
not been given so far. Moreover, deteriorating Russia-EU relations, mutual 
sanctions, growing distrust and resentment threaten the process of Baltic in-
tegration. At the same time, both parties acknowledge the need for coopera-
tion development and mutual interest in the sustainable development of the 
region. This contradiction is manifested, firstly, in cancelling the 2014 sum-
mer summit of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in Turku (for the first 
time in 22 years) due to the Ukraine events [2] and, secondly, in the success-
ful performance of the Baltic Development Forum with active Russian par-
ticipation in both 2014 and 2015 [5]. 
The problem is aggravated by the fact that Russia’s attitude to the 
EUSBSR is rather ambiguous. At the initial stage, it provoked criticism from 
the country, which considered it excessive and potentially destructive to the 
established regional structures. Both Russia and Finland opposed the idea of 
associating the EUSBSR with the ND. Today, Russia is more constructive 
towards the Strategy. However, the country’s final position has not been 
formulated so far. 
Therefore, it is evident that regardless of the emphasis on the ‘territorial’ 
nature of the Baltic Sea, its problem cannot be solved without Russia. Thus, 
the EUSBSR became an important project not only in the framework of the 
EU’s external policy and in the context of Russia-EU relations. 
A result of successful the EUSBSR implementation could be the creation 
of a transnational zone of intensive cooperation and using such projects for 
other regions both in the EU (a proposal was voiced to devise a similar 
Strategy for the Danube region) and beyond it, for example, in the frame-
work of Eurasian integration. 
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The novelty of the Baltic macroregional cooperation concept lies in a 
complex approach to regional development as an untied whole rather than an 
administrative unit serving as a platform for different cooperation schemes. 
This concept, being a product of rational functionalism, redefines the notion 
of the ‘region’. Whether the success of macroregional approach depends on 
the right economic and geographical balance of sources or it is shaped by a 
certain level of regional identity (cultural homogeneity) is still unclear. In 
the process of devising the EUSBSR, it was often stressed that the region 
could be somewhat of a test due to both its needs and problems and the high 
level of cohesion, common institutions, regional identity or, at least, cultural 
affinity. In other words, it has all the elements that, according to most schol-
ars, embody the essence of a region and create favourable prerequisites for 
regional development. 
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